Syria: Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment

[Syrian herder in 2011. Image by Joel Bombardier via Flickr.] [Syrian herder in 2011. Image by Joel Bombardier via Flickr.]

Syria: Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment

By : Jadaliyya Reports

[The following report was issued by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations in June 2012.]

Syria: Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment 

Summary of Findings

Crops and livestock sectors are  the most affected by the ongoing crisis in the country. Table  1 summarizes the total damages and losses in the nine governorates in the crop, irrigation and livestock subsectors.

Majorly affected crops are the strategic crops, such as wheat and barley; fruit and other trees (cherry, olive, other fruits, ornamental trees) and vegetables in the nine governorates. Rise in fuel costs and unavailability of labor force have forced the farmers either to abandon farming or leave the standing crops unattended. Migrant labors, mainly from the northeastern and eastern parts of the country, have left the agriculture producing areas due to insecurity, which has caused a severe shortage of labor. Labor wages have gone up sharply and the farmers are not able to hire the required number of labors due to lack of money. Harvesting of wheat has been delayed in Daará, Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama due to lack of labor and reluctance of the machineries owners to rent out their machineries due to insecurity, and hundreds of hectares of wheat are not harvested. There is thus a great risk of losing part of the crop if there is further delay. At the same time, the livelihood of the "returnee" migrant labors in their places of origin is at serious threat due to lack of employment opportunities, and fast depletion of their resources. Selling of assets has become common among the most vulnerable in all the governorates as an immediate coping strategy. Insecurity has caused restriction in movements of farmers and extension workers that has seriously hampered the agriculture related activities. Pest and insect attacks are not properly addressed. Farmers are turning back to the forest for firewood due to the unavailability of cooking gas and fuel, and deforestation is on the rise.

Irrigation is affected as the electric pumps are not operating at their full capacity due to lack of diesel and high prices. Frequent electricity cuts do not allow pump operation at full capacity, which eventually affects the crops and the fruit trees. In irrigated areas, some channels have been clogged and damaged due to lack of labor and inaccessibility. Lack of fuel and electricity cuts have affected water supply and distribution of water in the fields, which created chaos and social tension among the farmers. Canals in some areas have been reported breached by the farmers due to unavailability of sufficient irrigation water.

The livestock sector has been affected to a greater extent. The hike in fuel, fodder and concentrated feed prices has forced the herders and small families to sell a part of their flock at reduced price to meet their growing expenditures. Herders reported to have some of their livestock killed or stolen during the crisis. Insecurity has hindered the movement of animal health workers from the governorate capitals to the villages, preventing proper animal health service from being provided. No outbreak of any animal disease, however, has been reported so far. Insecurity has also hindered the movement of livestock  for grazing, especially in the grazing land zones 1, 2, 3, and 4, in particular in Homs, Idleb and Hama. The Bedouins from Al Badia are moving to northern and northeastern provinces putting more pressure on the pastures there. Furthermore, due to the prolonged drought in zone 5, Bedouins in Al Badia also reported that the livestock reproduction rate has been affected.

The poultry sector has been severely affected by the ongoing crisis. Imports of mother chicks from abroad for the production of one-day chicks in the country are hampered due to import restrictions. Lack of fuel, load shedding and rises in poultry feed prices has nearly doubled the production costs of eggs and chicks. In the meantime, major chicken producing farms in Homs, Hamah and Idleb have been closed, making the supply of poultry meat lower than the demand, and the price has significantly increased in the local markets. Many of the poultry farms producing chicks have stopped their operations, in particular in Rural Damascus, which supplies one-day old chicks, and the running farms have reduced their capacities by almost half. Workers, who mostly hailed from the northeastern and eastern part of the country, have been laid off. The ones currently operating at reduced capacity with resident labor families are taking losses, but are hopeful that the situation will normalize and their business will pick up.

The inland fishery subsector, which provides protein as well as cash income to the local communities, was affected to some extent by the crisis. Details of the damages and losses in fisheries, however, could not be obtained.

The Department of Agriculture in different governorates reported to have lost vehicles, farm machinery and some heavy equipment. Some of the extension service facilities in the areas have been burned and robbed. The extension and animal health workers are also reported to not be in a position to travel to rural areas to support the farmers and herders due to growing insecurity. Forest monitors are unable to monitor their works, and deforestation is reported to be on the rise, as people are going to the forest to collect firewood thanks to rising fuel costs.

In general, the depreciation of the Syrian Pound (SYP) has been a severe blow to the purchasing power of Syrian citizens. Inflation has dramatically risen and the food prices have drastically gone up, and the prices of milk,  meat and chicken have gone to as high as three hundred percent in certain places. Though the rural population is able to get some food items from the local traders, the credit limit they are allowed is two thousand Syrian pounds for a maximum of two weeks. Since the rural traders are also small ones, it is difficult for the vulnerable people to ask for food and other commodities on credit for long periods of time. Thanks to the support provided by the government, local bakeries are functioning and bread is still available in required quantities for about nine Syrian pounds per kilogram; however, lack of gas and fuel is slowly putting pressure on the supply of bread as well. In some directly crisis-hit areas, as reported in Aleppo, people are unable to go to the bakeries and queue up for bread due to insecurity. Instead, some intermediaries are supplying the bread at doorsteps at double price, which the poor and vulnerable farmers simply cannot afford.

Indebtedness among the rural families is on the rise, and the devaluation of the Syrian pound has put additional pressure on the small farmers and herders. Almost sixty percent of the households visited in Palmyra in Eastern Homs and Daar’a reported to have taken out loans from relatives, and some of them as high as sixty thousand Syrian pounds. In rural areas, where most of the people are at the subsistence level,  thanks to the existing social fabric and system, borrowing exists at no interest rate. However, the irony is that since the situation of one family compared to another is not much different, no one is in a real good position to lend money to others. Furthermore, in some of the agriculture production areas, such as Daará and Rural Damascus, the local merchants and money lenders are lending money in US dollars only, and the medium-sized farmers with three to five hectares of land are entering into a vicious cycle of debt in hard currency. Since banking facilities and the provision of soft loans have been suspended at the moment, the small and medium-sized farmers are facing more difficulty accessing cash to meet the higher production costs.

Among the most vulnerable in the rural population, which accounts for about thirty percent of the rural population, five to ten percent is reported to be female-headed and is the most vulnerable. With little to no income and very little savings, high recurring expenses and many mouths to feed, their resources are fast depleting. The coping strategy for the small farmers and female-headed households is to cut the daily meals from three to two, stop eating meat, eat lower quality food, reduce the size of meals, buy less expensive food, buy food on credit, take children out of school, send children and young daughters to work, selling livestock and other assets, and cut back on medical and education expenses. Even the richest family in the village during a visit to Al Hassake reported to have food stock for only one more month.

Most of the vulnerable families visited across the country reported  less income and more expenditure, and their life is becoming more difficult day by day. Some of the women interviewed confirmed to have sold their assets (including jewelries) to cope with the situation. One woman interviewed in Daará reported to have started begging in the street. Other women interviewed in Palmyra in Eastern Homs, Al Haasake, Al Raqqa and Aleppo confirmed the deterioration of their living conditions from beginning of this year and that their livelihood is just on the verge of  collapse.

In some of the rural areas visted, seasonal migration of young boys and men to Lebanon and Saudi Arabia for work played an important role at the household level, especially for remittance. However, due to recent crisises in Lebanon and the danger of movement within Syria, people are afraid of moving out of their villages. A few families in Eastern Homs, mainly in the Al Badia region with the family size as big as seventeen, with almost no agriculture and very few heads of livestock, and largely dependent on remittance, feared a complete collapse of their livelihood system if the current situation continues for some time. A few families reported having their men still in Lebanon, but were unable to send any remittance due to unemployment there.

The Daará governorate alone that hosted nearly two hundred thousand migrant labors reported the return of nearly seventy percent of its labor force. Since most of this labor force originated from the northeastern and northern governorates, the mission observed additional stress on the natural resources and food demand in these areas with the return. With fewer income-generating opportunities for the returnee families, most of their savings have already been consumed. This has put extreme psychological pressure on these families, and some of them reported to be taking psychiatric medicines, which unfortunately was another financial burden for them. While visiting Al Hassake and Al Raqqa, the mission met some of these returnee families and found that these families are some of the most vulnerable ones. With no employment back in their native villages, large and extended families with almost no coping mechanism left reported that their livelihood was just on the verge of collapse. 

The mission concludes that the farming and livestock-based livelihoods and household level food security of about thirty percent of the rural population and the internally displaced families currently living in the urban and semi-urban settings, which is about  three million people,[1] faces a real threat and they need urgent assistance. For agriculture and livestock support, this totals to nearly 375,000 households.  They are mainly subsistence farmers with less than 0.5 hectares of land, herders with less than thirty heads of livestock and internally displaced families living with their relatives or in rented houses in urban and semi-urban areas. Their household level food security situation is rapidly deteriorating and the coping strategy is also getting gradually diminished. These people need urgent food assistance as a life saving measure, and agriculture and livestock input assistance as life-sustaining intervention to restore their farming and livestock-based livelihoods. Particular attention needs to be given to the "returnee" migrant labors, female-headed households, small farmers, and small Bedouins and herders. Given the sense of urgency, this assistance is needed without any further delay. If the timely assistance is not provided, the livelihood system of these vulnerable people could simply collapse in few months time. Since the winter is approaching in few months time, urgent action is therefore necessary.

The following table represents the summary of damanges, losses and the overall short-term needs for the next twelve months. 

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The following table presents the summary of most immediate short-term life-saving and life-sustaining needs in US Dollars for the next 3 to 6 months to be provided to the most vulnerable families. 

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NOTES

[1] This  caseload  figure is estimated based on the total population of about twenty million in the most affected nine governorates of Daará, Rural Damascus, Homs, Hama, Idleb, Aleppo, Al Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Al Hassake with forty-six percent of the population living in rural areas, out of which thirty percent are considered as the most vulnerable rural farming and herder families. An additional caseload of around three hundred thousand people is estimated in urban and semi-urban areas displaced from the crisis-affected areas around the country based on the consultations carried out in the governorates.

[Click here to download the full report.] 

Past is Present: Settler Colonialism Matters!

On 5-6 March 2011, the Palestine Society at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London will hold its seventh annual conference, "Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine." This year`s conference aims to understand Zionism as a settler colonial project which has, for more than a century, subjected Palestine and Palestinians to a structural and violent form of destruction, dispossession, land appropriation and erasure in the pursuit of a new Jewish Israeli society. By organizing this conference, we hope to reclaim and revive the settler colonial paradigm and to outline its potential to inform and guide political strategy and mobilization.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often described as unique and exceptional with little resemblance to other historical or ongoing colonial conflicts. Yet, for Zionism, like other settler colonial projects such as the British colonization of Ireland or European settlement of North America, South Africa or Australia, the imperative is to control the land and its resources -- and to displace the original inhabitants. Indeed, as conference keynote speaker Patrick Wolfe, one of the foremost scholars on settler colonialism and professor at La Trobe University in Victoria, Australia, argues, "the logic of this project, a sustained institutional tendency to eliminate the Indigenous population, informs a range of historical practices that might otherwise appear distinct--invasion is a structure not an event."[i]

Therefore, the classification of the Zionist movement as a settler colonial project, and the Israeli state as its manifestation, is not merely intended as a statement on the historical origins of Israel, nor as a rhetorical or polemical device. Rather, the aim is to highlight Zionism`s structural continuities and the ideology which informs Israeli policies and practices in Palestine and toward Palestinians everywhere. Thus, the Nakba -- whether viewed as a spontaneous, violent episode in war, or the implementation of a preconceived master plan -- should be understood as both the precondition for the creation of Israel and the logical outcome of Zionist settlement in Palestine.

Moreover, it is this same logic that sustains the continuation of the Nakba today. As remarked by Benny Morris, “had he [David Ben Gurion] carried out full expulsion--rather than partial--he would have stabilised the State of Israel for generations.”[ii] Yet, plagued by an “instability”--defined by the very existence of the Palestinian nation--Israel continues its daily state practices in its quest to fulfill Zionism’s logic to maximize the amount of land under its control with the minimum number of Palestinians on it. These practices take a painful array of manifestations: aerial and maritime bombardment, massacre and invasion, house demolitions, land theft, identity card confiscation, racist laws and loyalty tests, the wall, the siege on Gaza, cultural appropriation, and the dependence on willing (or unwilling) native collaboration and security arrangements, all with the continued support and backing of imperial power. 

Despite these enduring practices however, the settler colonial paradigm has largely fallen into disuse. As a paradigm, it once served as a primary ideological and political framework for all Palestinian political factions and trends, and informed the intellectual work of committed academics and revolutionary scholars, both Palestinians and Jews.

The conference thus asks where and why the settler colonial paradigm was lost, both in scholarship on Palestine and in politics; how do current analyses and theoretical trends that have arisen in its place address present and historical realities? While acknowledging the creativity of these new interpretations, we must nonetheless ask: when exactly did Palestinian natives find themselves in a "post-colonial" condition? When did the ongoing struggle over land become a "post-conflict" situation? When did Israel become a "post-Zionist" society? And when did the fortification of Palestinian ghettos and reservations become "state-building"?

In outlining settler colonialism as a central paradigm from which to understand Palestine, this conference re-invigorates it as a tool by which to analyze the present situation. In doing so, it contests solutions which accommodate Zionism, and more significantly, builds settler colonialism as a political analysis that can embolden and inform a strategy of active, mutual, and principled Palestinian alignment with the Arab struggle for self-determination, and indigenous struggles in the US, Latin America, Oceania, and elsewhere.

Such an alignment would expand the tools available to Palestinians and their solidarity movement, and reconnect the struggle to its own history of anti-colonial internationalism. At its core, this internationalism asserts that the Palestinian struggle against Zionist settler colonialism can only be won when it is embedded within, and empowered by, the broader Arab movement for emancipation and the indigenous, anti-racist and anti-colonial movement--from Arizona to Auckland.

SOAS Palestine Society invites everyone to join us at what promises to be a significant intervention in Palestine activism and scholarship.

For over 30 years, SOAS Palestine Society has heightened awareness and understanding of the Palestinian people, their rights, culture, and struggle for self-determination, amongst students, faculty, staff, and the broader public. SOAS Palestine society aims to continuously push the frontiers of discourse in an effort to make provocative arguments and to stimulate debate and organizing for justice in Palestine through relevant conferences, and events ranging from the intellectual and political impact of Edward Said`s life and work (2004), international law and the Palestine question (2005), the economy of Palestine and its occupation (2006), the one state (2007), 60 Years of Nakba, 60 Years of Resistance (2009), and most recently, the Left in Palestine (2010).

For more information on the SOAS Palestine Society 7th annual conference, Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine: www.soaspalsoc.org

SOAS Palestine Society Organizing Collective is a group of committed students that has undertaken to organize annual academic conferences on Palestine since 2003.

 


[i] Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event, Cassell, London, p. 163

[ii] Interview with Benny Morris, Survival of the Fittest, Haaretz, 9. January 2004, http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/php/art.php?aid=5412